DEVLET DIŞI SİLAHLI GRUPLARIN MUKAVEMET STRATEJİSİ: DEFAKTO YÖNETİMLERİN ARAÇSALLAŞTIRILMASI

Author :  

Year-Number: 2022-LVIII
Yayımlanma Tarihi: 2022-06-27 00:51:03.0
Language : İngilizce
Konu : Uluslararası İlişkiler
Number of pages: 1909-1948
Mendeley EndNote Alıntı Yap

Abstract

Bu makale, de-facto hükümet yapılarının Devlet Dışı Silahlı Gruplar için bir mukavemet/dayanıklılık stratejisi olarak nasıl kullanılabileceğini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. İç savaş ve sonrasında, bu gruplar meşruiyete, savaşçıya, kaynaklara; ve onların siyasi davranışlarını, stratejilerini, seçimlerini, tehdit algılarını ve belirli bir bölgedeki diğer aktörlerle etkileşimlerini şekillendiren diğer bileşenlere ihtiyaç duyarlar. De-facto hükümetler kurarak, bu silahlı gruplar giderek daha fazla yerel odaklı bir strateji benimser ve bölgeyi araçsallaştırırlar. Bu çalışma, terörizmin topraksız doğasından yeniden bölgesel terörizme geçişle birlikte, toprakları kontrol eden ve yönetişim tesisleri kuran bu silahlı grupların daha uzun yaşadığını ileri sürmektedir. Çalışma, Heyet Tahrir El Şam (HTS) tarafından kurulan Suriye Kurtuluş Hükümeti ile Demokratik Birlik Partisi (PYD) tarafından kurulan Kuzey ve Doğu Suriye Özerk Yönetimi'ni Afrika'nın uzun süreli fiili hükümetlerinden biri olan Somaliland ile karşılaştırmaktadır.

 

Keywords

Abstract

This article seeks to explain how de-facto government structures can be used as a durability/resilience strategy for Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs). During intrastate wars and after, these groups are in need of legitimacy, fighter, resources, and other components that shape their political behaviors, strategies, choices, threat perceptions, and interactions with other actors in a specific territory. By establishing de-facto governments, these armed groups adopt an increasingly locally-focused strategy and instrumentalize the territory. This study also claims that with the shift from the de-territorial nature of terrorism to re-territorial terrorism, these armed groups that control territory and establish governance facilities are likely to live longer. The study compares the Syrian Salvation Government that was established by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria that was established by Democratic Union Party (PYD) with Somaliland, one of Africa’s long-lasting de-facto governments.

Keywords


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